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Abstract 
In this paper we investigate the relationship between trade union density and social 
expenditure for OECD member countries from 1980 to 2010. Two causal mechanisms have 
been invoked to explain the positive correlation that has been identified between union 
membership and social expenditure. On the one hand, unions try to influence policy decisions, 
but on the other hand it is easier for trade unions to mobilize members in an economic system 
that spends more resources on redistribution. The time series analysis indicates that trade 
union density is a significant determinant of social expenditure, and that this effect is most 
prominent in coordinated market economies. The findings also show a strong policy feedback 
mechanism whereby social expenditure has an effect on subsequent levels of union density, 
regardless of the contextual political system. We close with some speculation about the 
implications of these findings in the current economic downturn. 
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Trade unions have played a quintessential role in the establishment and development of 
contemporary welfare states in Europe (Boeri, Brugiavini and Calmfors 2001; Regini and 
Esping-Andersen 1980). It has been shown that trade unions have an effect on economic 
performance (Golden 1993), wage levels and unemployment (Checchi and Nunziata 2011), 
and levels of social protection (Donado and Wälde 2012). Although it has been argued by 
some authors that trade unions have lost most of their political power in the most recent era, a 
variety of studies have suggested that unions still have a meaningful impact on social policy, 
including case studies of specific countries and policies (Anderson and Meyer 2003; Béland 
2001), as well as cross-national empirical research (Boreham, Hall and Leet 1996; Bradley et 
al. 2003). The question of how exactly trade unions can have an effect on social policy 
becomes all the more salient in the current economic climate, that is characterized by both 
welfare state retrenchment in numerous countries and a general decline in union density 
(Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2013). 
One way to explain the policy effect of trade unions would be to apply insights from 
the social movement literature in general on trade unions as a specific social movement or 
collective policy actor. In the literature on the policy effect of collective mobilization efforts, 
a recurrent focus is on the way interest groups and social movements are successful in using 
the opportunities that are being offered by the political system (Richardson 2000). While this 
view is appealing, it must be supplemented with the insight that the state itself should also be 
seen as an autonomous actor, pursuing its own goals (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 
1985). Government policy is not just a reaction to outside pressures, but it also develops 
according to its own logic, leading to clear societal and policy results. These, in turn might 
have an effect on the organizing potential of civil society (Campbell 2003). For example, 
while it is important to determine whether feminist movements have had an effect on 
government policy (Htun and Weldon 2012), other research suggests that government policies 
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aimed at promoting gender equality encourage the development of feminist organizations in 
what has been called state feminism (McBride and Mazur 1995). A similar logic seems to 
apply to trade unions, as earlier studies have shown that specific elements of the political and 
social systems have an effect on trade union density (Ebbinghaus, Gobel, and Koos 2011).    
Applying the insights from the social movement literature to trade unions, our aim in 
the current paper is to investigate the role of policy feedback in the relationship between trade 
unions and welfare policy. We investigate union impact on state policy, as well as the reverse 
effect, which might be labeled a form of ‘state unionism’. 
While we examine whether trade unions have an effect on government policy, we also 
investigate whether specific types of political economies or welfare state arrangements have 
an effect on trade union density. We do so by conducting a time series analysis on data for all 
OECD countries, for the period 1980-2010. This long observation period allows us to 
disentangle reciprocal effects. As previous research shows that trade unions have strong 
policy effects (Jensen 2012; Skocpol 1992; Weldon 2011, 57-81), we can assume that unions 
offer an excellent case to investigate the occurrence of these policy feedback effects. 
In this article we first offer an overview on the literature with regard to the effect of 
interest groups on government with a special emphasis on the role of feedback mechanisms, 
and review the literature regarding the relationship between trade unions and social policy. 
Subsequently we present data and methods, and we close with some observations on what 
these results might imply in the current climate of welfare state entrenchment. 
 
Interest Groups and Policy Effects: Steps in the Policy Process 
It is generally assumed that political decision makers respond in some way or another to the 
demands being voiced by political participants (Moe 1980; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 
2012, 139-144). For a number of social movements, this claim has already been empirically 
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investigated (Burstein and Linton 2002; McAdam and Boudet 2012). The claim about the 
effect of social movement activity on government policy basically rests on three distinct 
causal steps (Schlozman et al. 2012, 117-146). First, it is assumed that citizens engage in 
movements and parties in order to express their preferences with regard to government policy. 
Engagement, therefore, not only has an expressive but also an instrumental motivation. 
Second, engagement implies not only a transfer of information; it also means that participants 
exert pressure on political decision makers to have their preferences taken into account 
(Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). The third step is that this pressure actually leads to a 
result, so that in the absence of countervailing pressures, government policy is indeed 
influenced by participation.  
The first two steps of this causal chain have been well-documented: there is ample 
research on the motivation of members and participants, and there is also an impressive body 
of literature on the way social movement activists can exert pressure on political decision 
makers (Giugni, McAdam, and Tilly 1999). Since it is notoriously difficult to demonstrate 
political influence, the third step in the causal chain is less well investigated. While case 
studies have shown that protest activity, organized strikes, or others forms of social 
movement activity had an effect on political decision-making (Giugni, McAdam, and Tilly 
1999), large comparative investigations of this relationship remain rather scarce. 
Prior research has confirmed that various forms of mobilization have an effect on 
government policy, including voter mobilization (Hill and Leighley 1992; Hill, Leighley, and 
Hinton-Andersson 1995), as well as various non-institutionalized forms of participation 
(Gillion 2012; Tarrow 1998). For example, Htun and Weldon’s (2012) comparative 
investigation of the effect of feminist mobilization on policies regarding violence against 
women provides compelling evidence of the impact of social movement mobilization on 
government policy. However, similar to most of the available studies on the relationship 
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between social movements and policy outcomes, Htun and Weldon’s (2012) study fails to 
include a test for possible feedback effects, as it is likely that policies on gender equality also 
have an effect on the mobilization potential of feminist social movement organizations.  
Including these feedback mechanisms in the research design is important because the 
correlation between mobilization levels and specific policies does not yet inform us about the 
causal logic involved. Insights from the political process model (McAdam 1982) even allow 
us to suggest a reversal of the causal claim: movements will be especially successful in 
mobilization if the political elite allows sufficient leeway for contentious activity on a specific 
issue (Amenta, Caren, and Stobaugh 2012; Campbell 2003). As McAdam (1982) has argued, 
the fact that the Democratic Party no longer supported segregation practices in the Southern 
States led to a more open opportunity structure for the civil rights movement and for policy 
changes implemented by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. While it is tempting to 
see these policy changes as a result of civic mobilization, McAdam suggests that changing 
structures in political elite alliances were the main driving force for policies designed to curb 
segregation. This approach, therefore, concurs with Rueschemeyer and Evans’s (1985) insight 
that the state, or specific government policies should also be considered as independent 
variables that can have an effect on social actors. Previous research has hinted at the fact that 
institutional factors might have an effect on union density as well (Ebbinghaus, Gobel, and 
Koos 2011). 
 
Investigating a Policy Feedback Loop: Union Density and Social Expenditure 
Trade unions offer an ideal case to investigate the feedback loop with public policy as 
research shows that unions do not just have strong policy goals, but that they are also quite 
successful in reaching those goals (Streeck and Hassel 2003). Power-resource theory 
attributes levels of equality and social solidarity to the strength of the labor movement, and 
7 
 
has been a prominent argument in the literature on political economies in advanced 
democracies (Korpi 1983, 1989; Thelen 2012). The strength of trade unions in influencing 
social policy has, however, been a subject of debate in the literature. Esping-Andersen’s 
(1990) proposal of three worlds of welfare capitalism critiqued power resource theory by 
arguing that the structure of class coalitions in a given regime is more important than the 
power resources of any single class, like the labor movement. In addition, research has shown 
that alternative factors such as economic development and institutional arrangements are also 
important predictors of social spending (Huber and Stephens 2001; Kittel and Obinger 2003; 
Swank 2002). Despite the credibility of alternate causes, the capacity of trade unions’ 
membership mobilization to influence social policy has been demonstrated in a number of  
cross-national studies on social policy and distributive politics (Boreham, Hall and Leet, 
1996; Bradley et al. 2003; Iversen 2001). 
In this paper, union strength is operationalized as union density, which is commonly 
used as a proxy for union strength (Lindvall 2013; Visser 2006). This allows us to rely on 
standardized international measurements for this indicator as trade union density figures are 
available from the International Labour Organisation. The literature suggests, however, that 
trade unions do not just have direct policy effects but can also exert their influence in a more 
indirect manner through their potential to mobilize the electorate (Gray and Caul 2000; 
Radcliff and Davis 2000). Since trade unions are positively associated with electoral turnout 
levels—particularly for lower-income and less-educated voters (Kerrissey and Schofer 2013; 
Leighley and Nagler 2007)—they are likely to put pressure on government coalitions to adopt 
more expansive social programs. Indeed, we know that trade unions can influence 
redistributive policies through direct political actions as well as by mobilizing voters for left 
political parties (Korpi 1989). It is important therefore also to take into account the level of 
voter turnout and the role of left political parties in our models.  
8 
 
The policy effect we investigate in this study is a measure of total social expenditure, 
which serves as a comprehensive indicator for the coverage offered by the welfare state 
(Jakobsen 2011; Kittel and Obinger 2003). The utility of the overall social expenditure 
measure has been debated, particularly among scholars of welfare state institutional change 
who are more interested in individual outcomes than in government outputs (Esping-
Andersen 1990). Since this measure is considered a very useful reflection of social policy 
decisions (Siegel 2007), however, it is an appropriate outcome of interest given the theoretical 
interest of our study. Indeed, despite influential critiques of the measure, the major studies in 
the field about the relationship between political actors and economic redistribution as 
reviewed by Jensen (2011) de facto rely on this indicator. Although some research has taken 
advantage of disaggregated categories of social expenditure available in these data (Castles 
2009; Kuitto 2011), the demarcation of sub-categories of spending can create problems in 
cross-national comparability. Pension expenditure, for example, can be more comparable 
when used as one element of total social expenditure rather than disaggregating to the level of 
individual programs or policy areas at the national level (De Deken and Kittel 2007). In line 
with earlier studies, we therefore opt for a comprehensive measure of social expenditure, 
rather than to select specific indicators that are more vulnerable to changes with regard to 
social policy, demography or other social trends (Huber and Stephens, 2001; Swank 1988). 
Policy effects of trade unions, however, should not be considered as an automatic 
reaction to trade union density, as these effects strongly depend on the nature of policy-
making arrangements within a specific political system. Especially in neo-corporatist or 
consociational political systems, trade unions are expected to have an effect on public policy 
as they are considered an important concertation group (Ebbinghaus, 2011; Molina and 
Rhodes 2002). We expect that this policy effect will be present mainly in political systems 
where political institutions play a major coordinating role with regard to the functioning of the 
9 
 
economy. In political systems where the government is heavily involved in the way the 
economy is being run, these mechanisms could allow trade unions to have an effect on the 
functioning of the economy and on mechanisms of redistribution (Jensen 2011). Following 
the Varieties of Capitalism literature (Hall and Soskice 2001), it can be assumed that trade 
unions will have an effect mainly in coordinated market economies where governments are 
actively involved in economic coordination (Hall and Gingerich 2009). If there is no 
coordination mechanism available, it is presumably more difficult for trade unions to have an 
impact on the economy. The Varieties of Capitalism framework is the most widely used 
approach in the contemporary study of political economies in advanced democracies, and has 
been used in the study of interest groups and social movements to investigate contextual 
effects (Cheon and Urpelainen 2013). In contrast to previous work that focused on one 
institutional arena only (i.e. either industrial relations or finance), the Varieties of Capitalism 
approach takes into account the linkages across all major institutions in the political 
economies of advanced democracies (Thelen 2012). 
Previous research suggests that trade unions pursue multiple goals, ranging from wage 
formation in the labor market, to influencing social policy in terms of advocating for the 
social and political rights of the labor market population (Boeri, Brugiavini, and Calmfors 
2001; Hamann, Johnston, and Kelly 2013; Lindvall 2013). In numerous countries, trade 
unions have as an explicit goal to influence government policy, not just on industrial relations 
but also more broadly on social policy (Feltenius 2007; Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick 
2010).  
 
These considerations lead to the main hypothesis in this paper:  
H1. The level of union density in a country is a significant determinant of the level of social 
expenditure. 
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In order to take account of a reverse policy feedback loop, we also include a second 
hypothesis:  
H2. The level of social expenditure in a country is a significant determinant of the level of 
union density. 
 
In addition, we investigate whether the relationship between union density and expenditure 
varies in systematic ways in countries that have different types of political economies: 
H3. The association between social expenditure and the level of union density is stronger in 
countries with a coordinated market economy than in countries with liberal market 
economies. 
 
Research Design  
To assess whether the level of union density in a country is related to the level of social 
expenditure, we have compiled a time series cross-sectional data set that spans the years 1980 
to 2010. The 30 countries in the data set include all major OECD countries for which full data 
are available. Our main analysis includes all 30 countries, but a parallel set of models was 
estimated for the 20 largest OECD countries only. We do so because results of the analysis 
might be too strongly influenced by small OECD countries or by less developed nations (Hall 
and Soskice 2001, 19-21). Findings for this subgroup were largely consistent with those for 
the overall sample, and can be viewed in the Appendix (Tables A2 and A3).
1
 
Our analysis includes both pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed-effects 
estimations in order to capitalize on the respective advantages of each approach. The pooled 
approach has the advantage of utilizing cross-country variation in both the independent and 
dependent variables. Thus, social expenditure in countries with high union density may be 
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compared to that in less unionized countries. One disadvantage to the pooled approach is that 
it may entail omitted variable bias, as unmeasured time-invariant country characteristics may 
be missing from the model. We therefore include a second set of models that include country 
fixed effects in order to eliminate cross-country variation. The fixed-effects models are 
informed exclusively by within-country comparisons, and therefore identify country-specific 
variation over time. Analyses of time-series cross-sectional data are known to suffer from 
potential violations of OLS assumptions, namely auto-correlation, heteroskedasticity and 
cross-sectional dependence (Beck and Katz 1995). To address this, we follow the common 
approach of using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors, which adjust the standard errors to be 
robust to these concerns (Cheon and Urpelainen 2013; Driscoll and Kraay 1998). 
The main political control variables that represent alternate theoretical explanations to 
the hypotheses tested in this study are government party orientation and voter turnout. In 
addition, we also control for GDP per capita, GDP growth, and time trends (see Appendix 
Table A1 for list of countries and descriptive statistics). The variables in the model are 
reviewed below. 
 
Variables used in the analysis 
Social expenditure. Social expenditure is measured as a percentage of GDP, as documented 
for the period 1980 to 2010 by the Social Expenditure Database (SocX) of the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2013)
2
. For the purpose of studying 
relatively long-term trends of social spending based on data that is valid for cross-national 
analysis, these data encompass the largest scope of social spending that is standardized for 
international comparison (Adema, Fron & Ladique 2011; Jensen 2011; Olaskoaga, Alaez-
Aller and Diaz De Basurto Uraga 2013; Siegel 2007). The SocX data is gathered by country 
on the level of detailed programs, and the total social expenditure measure is a composite of 
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four broad spending categories (pension spending; income support to the working-age 
population; health expenditures; and all other social service expenditures). Social expenditure 
is highest in countries like France (32.4 per cent of GDP in 2010) and Denmark (30.6 per 
cent) and Finland (29.6 per cent). Among the major OECD member states, the lowest figures 
are recorded in Australia (17.9 per cent), Canada (18.7) and the United States (19.8 per cent).  
Trade union density. Trade union density is an indicator of the strength of the trade union 
movement in terms of the degree to which workers are organized in a given context. This 
measure is clearly not a direct indicator of the political or bargaining power of unions given 
institutional differences across national settings in the relationship between unions and other 
political entities. Although measuring the strength of labor movements is a complex task, the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) has worked to standardize the data across countries 
(Hayter and Stoevska 2011), and the union density measure we use in this analysis is taken 
from Visser’s Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State 
and Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS) which draws on ILO and supplementary data 
(Visser 2006; 2011, 3). The union density rate we use in this study is measured as the net 
union membership as a proportion of employed wage and salary earners (Visser 2013). Union 
density therefore provides a clear indication of the scope of trade unions as a collective actor 
in a specific polity. Trade union density varies from 11.4 per cent of the labour force in the 
US, to 70.3 per cent in Finland, with an OECD average of 17.6 per cent. 
Government party orientation. The orientation of the ruling executive party toward 
economic policy can clearly exert an independent influence on social expenditure, with left-
oriented parties expected to enact higher social expenditures. Previous studies have indeed 
indicated a positive relationship between leftist parties in power and the level of welfare 
spending (Castles and Obinger 2007; Hicks and Swank 1992). To control for this factor we 
use the World Bank’s Database of Political Institution’s measure of the party orientation of 
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the executive with respect to economic policy (Beck et al. 2001; Keefer 2013). We code this 
as a dichotomous variable, distinguishing between when the left party is in power (1), and 
when center or right parties are in power (0). 
Voter turnout. Turnout level has been shown to be correlated with social expenditure: in 
political systems with higher levels of electoral turnout, governments generally spend more 
resources on social expenditure (Hicks and Swank 1992; Larcinese 2007; Mahler 2008). We 
therefore control for turnout level using voter turnout data from the Institute for Democracy 
and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). 
GDP per capita and GDP growth. We include GDP per capita in the model (measured in 
thousands of dollars) to control for the possibility that social expenditure is associated with 
economic development. We also control for GDP growth (measured as a percentage change) 
to account for the possibility that governments adjust social policy in response to economic 
fluctuation. Both of these measures are from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators. 
Time trend. Since we know that trade union density has generally decreased over time while 
social expenditure has increased, we add a time trend variable that controls for the number of 
years elapsed since 1980. 
Varieties of Capitalism. The Varieties of Capitalism literature identifies cross-national 
differences in the coordination of actors in political economies, thereby identifying countries 
located at two ends of a spectrum. In liberal market economies (LME’s), competitive markets 
are the coordinating force governing the relationship between firms and other strategic actors. 
On the other end of the spectrum, in coordinated market economies (CME's) the different 
actors in the political economy are engaged in coordinated strategic interaction. The 
identification of these two ideal types of political economies is the core distinction in this 
theory (Hall and Soskice 2001, 8), although additional distinctions have emerged, including 
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‘mixed’ market economies (Hall and Gingerich 2009) and ‘emerging' market economies 
(Hancké, Rhodes, and Thatcher 2007). In examining the impact of different types of 
capitalism on the relationship between union density and social expenditure, we limit our 
analyses to the distinction between LME's and CME's since the theoretical implications of 
these two types of capitalism on the main variables in our analysis are clear, and there is 
general consensus regarding the assignment of nations to these two categories.
3
 Typical 
examples of liberal market economies are the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, while 
Belgium, Sweden, Israel and Japan can be considered as representative examples of 
coordinated market economies. To avoid undue influence of small countries in the analysis, 
we run the interaction effect for the large OECD countries only. 
 
Analysis Strategy and Findings 
Our analysis is carried out in two main steps. First, we estimate pooled OLS and fixed-effects 
regression models to explore the empirical determinants of social expenditure, with a 
particular interest in the predictive power of union density. We also explore interactions 
between union density and type of political economy, based on the hypothesis that the effect 
of unions may be stronger in certain types of political-economic environments. Second, we 
return the analytical arrow by investigating the impact of social expenditure on trade union 
density (with the same test for impact in different types of political economies). While time 
horizons for expected impacts on different kinds of expenditure is certainly expected to vary 
for different sub-categories of expenditure from the perspective of welfare reform (pension as 
a most prominent example), we follow the common practice of including a time-lag 
specification of the key explanatory variables by one year to allow for capturing delayed 
effects (e.g. De Deken and Kittel 2007). Additional analyses were conducted with time lags of 
two and three years yield consistent findings.
4
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Trade union density as a determinant of social expenditure 
First, we use union density to explain the level of social expenditure. The findings in Table 1 
show that there is a statistically and substantively significant relationship between union 
density and social expenditure, controlling for relevant national-level characteristics. The 
findings for the pooled analysis (Model 1) show that for every percentage point increase in 
union density, total social expenditure as a percentage of GDP increases by .12 percentage 
points.  
When country fixed effects are introduced to control for all time-invariant country 
characteristics (Model 3), the findings are no longer informed by cross-country variation, but 
rather tell us about the relationship between union density and social expenditure within a 
given country over time. The findings suggest that union density has a positive association 
with social expenditure within countries over time. In other words, as union density increases 
within a given country, social expenditure in that country is expected to increase as well. 
Moreover, we see that the two main political control variables of the political orientation of 
the party in power and voter turnout—which can be thought of as potential alternate 
theoretical explanations for changes in social expenditure—are not significant in the fixed 
effects model. 
When a one-year lag is added for union density in both the pooled and fixed effect 
models (Models 2 and 4, respectively), the point estimate is slightly lower, but pairwise 
significance tests show that the difference in effect size is not statistically significant. Thus, 
the substantive association between union density and social expenditure remains even with a 
one-year lag in the union density variable, which gives some suggestive support that union 
density impacts on social expenditure over time. Parallel models were estimated that also 
included the Industrial Labor Organization’s strike count as a control variable to account for 
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the activity of labor unions. The findings showed that in contrast to the large effect of union 
density, strike activity has no discernible effect on social expenditure either for the full set 
OECD countries or for the smaller subset of large OECD countries only (see Appendix, 
Tables A4 and A5). 
[Table 1 about here] 
The interaction findings for the relationship between the type of political economy and 
union density suggest that the relationship between union density and expenditure is much 
stronger in coordinated market economies than in liberal market economies. In the interaction 
analysis (Model 6), the main-effect union density coefficient estimates the association 
between union density and expenditure for liberal market economies; this coefficient is very 
small and carries no significance. The interaction term, however is considerable in magnitude 
and highly significant, suggesting a strong association between union density and social 
expenditure in coordinated market economies. 
The interaction effect in Model 6 is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows that in liberal 
market economies there is no effect at all of levels of trade union density on social 
expenditure. This means that in liberal market economies, trade unions’ mobilization of the 
work force is completely unrelated to the level of social expenditure. In coordinated market 
economies, on the other hand, we see a strong positive association. This interaction effect 
suggests a causal mechanism, as follows: trade union density has an effect on social 
expenditure, but only in those economies where governments are involved in a coordinated 
manner with economic governance. In other words, trade union’s effect on social policy is 
exerted only in contexts in which governments are an active part of governing and 
coordinating the market economy. In liberal market economies there is no trade union effect 
on social expenditure. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
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The feedback mechanism: Social expenditure as a determinant of trade union density 
Our competing second claim departs from the opposite causal logic, assuming that high levels 
of social expenditure render it easier for trade unions to function and to mobilize. In Table 2, 
therefore, trade union density is now the dependent variable. The structure of the regression, 
however, remains the same, including a one-year time lag of the theoretically-relevant 
explanatory variable (in this case, social expenditure).  
Similar to the previous analysis, the findings in Table 2 show that social expenditure 
has a statistically and substantively significant effect on union density, controlling for relevant 
national-level characteristics. The findings for the pooled analysis (Model 1) show that for 
every percentage point increase in social expenditure as a percentage of GDP, union density 
increases by 1.25 percentage points. This relationship holds with an added time lag, and with 
the addition of country fixed effects. Also similar to the previous analysis, the other two 
alternative theoretical mechanisms of voter turnout and party in power are not statistically 
significant in the country fixed effects models, while the relationship between expenditure 
and union density remains significant and substantive. 
[Table 2 about here] 
A different mechanism is apparent, however, regarding the interaction effect with 
varying political regimes. The interaction between social expenditure and type of market 
economy in Model 6 is not significant. As shown in Figure 2, this means that an increase in 
social expenditure is associated with an increase in union density, regardless of whether the 
political economy is liberal or coordinated. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
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Discussion 
This study contributes to recent large-N empirical scholarship that demonstrates an effect of 
citizen engagement on policy (Cheon and Urpelainen 2013; Gillion 2012; Htun and Weldon 
2012), and adds new insight in this field of study in three main ways. From an empirical 
perspective, this research adds new findings to our understanding of the relationship between 
trade unionism and social policy, and does so with a high-quality time-series cross-sectional 
dataset that includes reliable indicators for a large group of countries over a relatively long 
period of time. Second, the findings indicate the importance of political and economic context 
for the relationship between citizen engagement and policy outcomes by showing that trade 
unions affect social expenditure in some contexts (i.e. coordinated market economies) but not 
in others (i.e. liberal market economies). Finally, this study adds nuance to the study of citizen 
engagement and policy feedback mechanisms by showing that policy can and does impact 
upon the strength of social movements.  
A main empirical goal of the current paper is to ascertain whether trade union density 
is associated with social expenditure, and if so, in what manner any causal relationship might 
be identified. The analysis has made clear that trade union density is a significant determinant 
of the level of social expenditure, and that this effect is most prominent in political systems 
where government plays a coordination role in the economy. This interaction effect, by itself, 
renders plausible the causal claim that it is mainly because of their political influence that 
trade unions will also have an effect on the level of social expenditure. In liberal market 
economies, where the state does not engage in coordinated economic decision-making, trade 
unions lack the necessary tools to have an impact on social expenditure. By controlling for the 
executive’s party orientation and voter turnout, as well as all time-invariant country 
characteristics, we may rule out the possibility that the association is due to these factors. The 
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robustness of the finding when the union density variable is lagged is suggestive of a causal 
relationship  
When we reverse the analysis, it can be observed that levels of social expenditure have 
an effect on trade union density. Furthermore, we do not find any interaction with the 
Varieties of Capitalism variable, suggesting that regardless of the type of political economy, 
expenditure levels have a positive effect on subsequent trade union density. By combining the 
findings from these two directions of causal logic (i.e. union density’s impact on social 
expenditure, and social expenditure’s impact on union density), the results of this research 
show that trade unions are better able to impact upon policy in coordinated political 
economies that tend to have more generous welfare states. It falls outside the scope of the 
current article to investigate what kind of mechanism explains this relationship. In some 
countries trade unions are actively involved in administering at least some forms of social 
expenditure, while one might also speculate that social expenditure and social protection 
reduce the potential costs and risks associated with trade union membership. Why exactly 
trade unions are more successful in mobilizing members in more generous social systems, 
however, should be further investigated. 
The results of the current analysis are in line with the theoretical expectations with 
regard to the impact of trade unions in political systems where governments intervene in 
social concertation and social policy. Simultaneously, however, the findings allow us to add a 
theoretically meaningful nuance to the current literature by showing the occurrence of a 
strong policy feedback mechanism, by which levels of social expenditure have an effect on 
levels of trade union density regardless of the nature of contextual political systems. 
In sum, the reciprocal relation between trade union density and social expenditure 
allows us to assume the occurrence of a positive feedback cycle with two main components. 
First, trade union density is associated with a higher level of social expenditure, at least in 
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coordinated market economies. All available empirical studies, however, strongly suggest that 
trade union membership has systematically weakened in recent years (Bryson, Ebbinghaus, 
and Visser 2011). While this decline has taken place in democratic polities of all kinds, it 
seems that liberal market economies have experienced the greatest decline in trade union 
membership over the past five decades (Schmitt and Mitukiewicz 2012). The results of the 
current analysis therefore suggest that political decision makers now are less strongly exposed 
to social pressure to allocate resources to social expenditure. In this manner, the weakening of 
trade unions can be related to a trend to reduce levels of social protection. 
The second component of the policy feedback cycle is a powerful feedback loop 
whereby trade unions benefit greatly from high levels of social expenditure, regardless of 
whether the country has a liberal or coordinated market economy. As apparently, the 
mobilization success of trade unions is partly dependent on the opportunities created by the 
political institutions, this could be labelled as a form of ‘state unionism’. This loop is 
theoretically highly relevant, since studies of liberal and coordinated market economies over 
time suggest that the distinctions between these types of capitalism remain salient and may 
even be increasing (Thelen 2001, 81). Market mechanisms have become even more 
pronounced in liberal economies just as benefits entitlements have increased in coordinated 
economies (Hall and Gingerich 2009, 478-479).  
The findings of this study add new insights regarding a mechanism that contributes to 
the increased divergence between these types of capitalism: in coordinated market economies 
high levels of social expenditure encourage trade union mobilization, which, in turn exerts 
pressure to increase social expenditures; in contrast, liberal economies are characterized by 
lower levels of social expenditure and low, and even diminishing levels of trade union 
density. The current financial and economic crisis, therefore, clearly puts pressure on this 
positive feedback loop as governments in numerous OECD countries cut down on social 
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expenditure to reduce government benefits. The available data only allow us to investigate the 
trend up until the year 2010. Future research will have to ascertain whether the mechanisms 
we identified are also valid in subsequent times of budgetary and social hardship. 
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Table 1. Estimated Determinants of Social Expenditure 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES pooled pooled country fixed effects pooled pooled 
       
Union density (UD) 0.120***  0.067**  0.101*** 0.001 
 (0.011)  (0.024)  (0.007) (0.012) 
Union density t–1  0.117***  0.056**   
  (0.012)  (0.022)   
Left party in power 1.540*** 1.482*** -0.190 -0.099 0.205 -0.172 
 (0.405) (0.428) (0.288) (0.311) (0.276) (0.302) 
Voter turnout 0.032* 0.032* -0.001 -0.008 0.002 -0.007 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) 
GDP per capita 0.106*** 0.105*** -0.273*** -0.277*** -0.313*** -0.374*** 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.036) (0.031) (0.031) (0.044) 
GDP growth -0.645*** -0.636*** -0.215*** -0.225*** -0.348*** -0.341*** 
 (0.094) (0.101) (0.048) (0.044) (0.061) (0.055) 
Year 0.129*** 0.127*** 0.301*** 0.288*** 0.309*** 0.302*** 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.030) (0.023) (0.027) (0.030) 
Coordinated Market 
Economy (CME) 
    6.283*** 
(0.231) 
2.047*** 
(0.619) 
CME * UD      0.122*** 
      (0.018) 
Constant 9.836*** 9.960*** 18.513*** 19.628*** 16.205*** 21.799*** 
 (1.331) (1.322) (1.512) (1.384) (1.414) (1.863) 
       
Observations 712 719 712 719 440 440 
R-squared 0.344 0.339   0.756 0.782 
Number of groups 30 30 30 30 15 15 
Note: Entries are the result of ordinary least square regression models, with pooled sample 
and with country-specific effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Sign.: *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2. Estimated Determinants of Union Density 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES pooled pooled country fixed effects pooled pooled 
       
Social expend. (SE) 1.251***  0.463***  3.156*** 2.838*** 
 (0.056)  (0.149)  (0.267) (0.293) 
SE t–1  1.203***  0.434***   
  (0.055)  (0.126)   
Left party in power -0.504 -0.755 -0.066 -0.003 2.113 2.082 
 (1.264) (1.296) (0.619) (0.597) (1.726) (1.711) 
Voter turnout 0.395*** 0.388*** 0.044 0.037 0.163*** 0.148*** 
 (0.043) (0.044) (0.036) (0.034) (0.046) (0.051) 
GDP per capita 0.464*** 0.471*** 0.169** 0.128* 0.762*** 0.733*** 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.076) (0.075) (0.131) (0.129) 
GDP growth 0.599** 0.322 -0.069 -0.144** 1.288*** 1.251*** 
 (0.254) (0.290) (0.070) (0.061) (0.400) (0.395) 
Year -0.686*** -0.685*** -0.684*** -0.659*** -1.227*** -1.210*** 
 (0.040) (0.042) (0.060) (0.057) (0.069) (0.066) 
Coordinated market      -8.249*** -14.568** 
Economy (CME)     (1.143) (5.792) 
CME * SE      0.360 
      (0.311) 
Constant -16.945*** -14.583*** 32.979*** 34.704*** -33.634*** -26.632*** 
 (3.852) (4.211) (3.815) (3.482) (7.221) (9.094) 
       
Observations 712 688 712 688 440 440 
R-squared 0.373 0.370   0.496 0.497 
Number of groups 30 30 30 30 15 15 
Note: Entries are the result of ordinary least square regression models, with pooled sample 
and with country-specific effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Sign.: *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 1. Predicted Social Expenditure by Union Density 
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Figure 2. Predicted Union Density by Social Expenditure  
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Appendix Table A1. Descriptive Statistics  
 
Country
5
 
 
Expend 
(mean) 
UD 
(mean) 
Left 
(mean) 
Voter turnout 
(mean) 
GDP 
(mean) 
GDP Growth 
(mean) 
VoC 
 
Strikes 
(mean) 
Australia 15.02 33.20 0.55 94.70 19.60 3.23 1 1059 
Austria 26.46 41.76 0.79 85.79 21.35 2.17 2       3 
Belgium 26.29 52.87 0.03 92.08 20.35 1.97 2     86 
Canada 17.49 32.88 0.52 67.65 21.33 2.54 1   479 
Chile 11.13 14.97 0.52 89.24   4.33 4.91 .   127 
Denmark 26.75 75.23 0.36 86.00 26.69 1.69 2   519 
Finland 25.75 73.26 0.45 69.32 21.30 2.44 2   556 
France 27.72 10.48 0.45 66.25 19.77 1.82 . 1825 
Germany 25.12 28.28 0.30 80.66 20.94 1.79 2        . 
Great Britain 19.72 36.63 0.39 70.09 22.51 2.16 1       8 
Hungary 22.08 31.98 0.82 57.24   4.57 1.17 .       9 
Iceland 15.82 85.18 0.00 87.20 28.95 2.65 2     58 
Ireland 18.00 49.86 0.00 68.55 19.65 4.24 1     84 
Israel 16.92 85.18 0.30 87.20 28.95 2.65 2 1098 
Italy 22.64 38.34 0.24 85.16 17.29 1.50 .    341 
Japan 14.32 23.95 0.07 66.11 34.29 2.12 2    426 
Korea  5.63 12.83 0.00 66.60   9.52 6.04 2        0 
Luxembourg 21.12 45.52 0.00 88.87 38.39 4.09 .    247 
Mexico  5.00 19.38 0.64 56.96   5.39 2.68 .      21 
Netherlands 23.43 24.88 0.27 79.74 21.19 2.25 2    130 
New Zealand 19.21 36.99 0.45 84.75 12.76 2.21 1      14 
Norway 22.19 56.30 0.58 79.20 32.71 2.61 2  1467 
Poland 21.47 26.82 0.64 60.60   4.57 3.91 .    288 
Portugal 16.88 30.04 0.50 68.39   9.58 2.26 .        2 
Slovak Rep 17.54 31.74 1.00 72.89   5.86 2.46 .        . 
Slovenia 21.81 44.36 0.71 70.61 10.27 2.23 . 1085 
Spain 20.51 14.78 0.64 73.74 12.56 2.53 .     55 
Sweden 29.67 80.11 0.64 85.41 25.65 2.21 2     95 
Turkey 6.93 14.62 0.15 84.84   3.88 4.25 .   531 
USA 15.29 14.91 0.39 60.66 31.08 2.63 1     48 
        
Expend: Total public social expenditure from OECD SocX, measured as a percentage of GDP. 
 
UD: Union Density, Visser (2011) 
 
GDP:  From World Bank “World Development Indicators” (in thousands of dollars) 
 
Voter Turnout: From IDEA 
 
GDP Growth: From World Bank “World Development Indicators” (measured as % change) 
 
Left: based on World Bank’s “Database of Political Institutions”; 1=Left; 0=Right or Center 
 
Varieties of Capitalism (VoC): 
1 = Liberal Market Economies (LME); 2 = Coordinated Market Economies (CME); . = Neither  
 
Strikes: Total number of strikes and lockouts, from ILO standardized data (International Labor 
Organization 2013) 
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Appendix Table A2. Estimated Determinants of Social Expenditure: 
Large OECD Countries Only 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES pooled pooled country fixed effects 
     
Union density (UD) 0.124***  0.049**  
 (0.011)  (0.021)  
Union density t–1  0.123***  0.036* 
  (0.011)  (0.018) 
Left party in power 1.035*** 0.978*** -0.318 -0.196 
 (0.330) (0.348) (0.268) (0.300) 
Voter turnout 0.036** 0.033** -0.024 -0.025 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.020) 
GDP per capita 0.037 0.029 -0.519*** -0.540*** 
 (0.039) (0.040) (0.068) (0.064) 
GDP growth -0.590*** -0.618*** -0.243*** -0.252*** 
 (0.122) (0.116) (0.046) (0.046) 
Year 0.206*** 0.204*** 0.387*** 0.380*** 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.036) (0.030) 
Constant 10.310*** 10.946*** 26.301*** 27.401*** 
 (1.479) (1.521) (1.951) (1.869) 
     
Observations 577 576 577 576 
R-squared 0.369 0.368   
Number of groups 20 20 20 20 
Note: Entries are the result of ordinary least square regression models, with pooled 
sample and with country-specific effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Sign.: *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Appendix Table A3. Estimated Determinants of Union Density: 
 Large OECD Countries Only 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES pooled pooled country fixed effects 
     
Social expenditure (SE) 1.585***  0.378**  
 (0.116)  (0.157)  
SE t–1  1.525***  0.396** 
  (0.113)  (0.149) 
Left party in power 0.229 0.253 -0.175 -0.002 
 (1.539) (1.553) (0.657) (0.641) 
Voter turnout 0.555*** 0.549*** 0.077* 0.089* 
 (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.048) 
GDP per capita 0.729*** 0.728*** 0.199 0.165 
 (0.080) (0.078) (0.160) (0.165) 
GDP growth 0.853** 0.482 -0.088 -0.154* 
 (0.383) (0.422) (0.091) (0.079) 
Year -0.868*** -0.862*** -0.662*** -0.646*** 
 (0.046) (0.050) (0.088) (0.090) 
Constant -41.159*** -38.294*** 31.381*** 30.667*** 
 (3.493) (3.845) (5.871) (6.432) 
     
Observations 577 559 577 559 
R-squared 0.386 0.381   
Number of groups 20 20 20 20 
Note: Entries are the result of ordinary least square regression models, with pooled 
sample and with country-specific effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Sign.: *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table A4. Estimated Determinants of Social Expenditure, Including Strikes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES pooled pooled country fixed effects 
     
Union density (UD) 0.137***  0.073***  
 (0.012)  (0.024)  
Union density t–1  0.133***  0.057** 
  (0.013)  (0.021) 
Strike activity 0.001***  -0.000  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  
Strike activity t–1  0.001***  -0.000* 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Left party in power 1.995*** 2.001*** -0.464* -0.350 
 (0.394) (0.371) (0.262) (0.307) 
Voter turnout 0.021* 0.019 0.002 -0.005 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
GDP per capita 0.129*** 0.128*** -0.374*** -0.375*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.063) (0.058) 
GDP growth -0.587*** -0.576*** -0.191*** -0.204*** 
 (0.111) (0.095) (0.055) (0.047) 
Year 0.141*** 0.125*** 0.341*** 0.319*** 
 (0.029) (0.027) (0.041) (0.035) 
Constant 8.046*** 8.446*** 18.806*** 20.236*** 
 (1.083) (1.249) (1.600) (1.400) 
     
Observations 612 619 612 619 
R-squared 0.395 0.392   
Number of groups
6
 28 28 28 28 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table A5. Estimated Determinants of Social Expenditure, Including Strike Activity: 
Large OECD Countries Only 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES pooled pooled fixed effects fixed effects 
     
Union density (UD) 0.037***  0.011  
 (0.013)  (0.037)  
Union density t–1   0.035***  -0.018 
  (0.012)  (0.032) 
Strike activity -0.287  -0.217  
 (0.948)  (0.373)  
Strike activity t–1  -0.311  -0.363 
  (1.068)  (0.327) 
Left party in power 0.892** 0.918** -0.454* -0.345 
 (0.385) (0.398) (0.265) (0.301) 
Voter turnout 0.133*** 0.130*** -0.135*** -0.138*** 
 (0.022) (0.019) (0.047) (0.047) 
GDP per capita 0.122* 0.118 -0.751*** -0.778*** 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.066) (0.055) 
GDP growth -0.607*** -0.545*** -0.271*** -0.234*** 
 (0.124) (0.109) (0.060) (0.046) 
Year 0.131*** 0.110*** 0.425*** 0.409*** 
 (0.030) (0.026) (0.038) (0.036) 
Constant 7.914*** 8.484*** 42.973*** 45.133*** 
 (2.162) (2.017) (4.779) (3.738) 
     
Observations 389 390 389 390 
R-squared 0.356 0.351   
Number of groups 14 14 14 14 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Endnotes  
 
                                                          
1
. We follow the categorization used by Hall and Soskice, of large OECD nations which 
includes 22 nations (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, USA). Countries like Luxembourg and Iceland are not 
included due to their small size, and other countries like Mexico are not included because of 
their low GDP/capita (Hall and Soskice 2001, 19-21). Tables A2 and A3 include 20 of these 
22 nations, since requisite data is not available for Greece and Switzerland. 
2
 . In an alternative operationalization, we also included the yearly rate of change in social 
expenditure as a dependent variable. In line with the results of Huber et al. (2008), however, 
this led to very small coefficients that cannot be easily interpreted. Following the conclusions 
of the Huber et al. article we therefore opted to use social expenditure as a whole as 
dependent variable. 
3
. An alternative operationalization of economic and governmental coordination would be to 
include the degree of wage coordination within an economy (Hall and Gingerich 2009). This 
information, however, is not available for some of the countries under investigation. 
4
. Models with two and three year time lags (available from the authors) are all directionally 
consistent with the one-year lag findings, though in some cases coefficients are weaker and 
have reduced p-values. 
5
. Of the OECD countries, four are not included in the analysis due to lack of data (Czech 
Republic, Estonia and Greece and Switzerland). 
6
.
 
ILO Strike count data is unavailable for two of the countries in our dataset (Germany and 
Slovak Republic) reducing the total number of countries in the full analysis to 28. 
